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COMMENTS

MARITAL DISABILITY IN PERSONAL TORT ACTIONS
GENERAL STATUS

The effect of the married women's statutes or emancipation acts,
which have been passed in all jurisdictions,' has been to dissolve the
fictional unity of husband and wife which existed at early common law?
As a consequence the courts have generally allowed married women to bring
an action against their husbands for torts involving the wife's separate
property.3
The majority of jurisdictions in interpreting the emancipation acts still
do not allow a personal tort action by one spouse against the other. 4 The

1. These statutes are collected in 3 VERNIER,
179, 180 (1935). For a typical group of statutes see

LAws §§ 167,
(1957).
2. "[It is perfectly apparent that the legal unity of husband and wife is now
hardly more than an anachronistic fiction." Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 47 N.J.
AMERICAN FAMILY
FLA. STAT.
708

cl.

Super. 196, 201, 135 A.2d 555, 558 (1957).

3. Conversion: Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So.2d 13 (1950);
Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937);
Madget v. Madget, 85 Ohio App. 18, 87 N.E.2d 918 (1949).
Trespass:
Larison v. Larison, 9 111.App. 27 (1881); Weldon v. DeBathe,
14 Q.B.D. 339 (1884).
Replevin:
White v. White, 58 Mich. 546, 25 N.W. 490 (1885); Howland
V. Howland, 20 Hun 472 (N.Y. 1880); Cf. Tresber v. McElroy,
90 Fla. 372, 106 So. 79 (1925).
Waste:
Ferter v. Kear, 126 Pa. 470, 17 Atl. 668 (1889); Boston v.
Boston, 190 S.W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
Ejectment: Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (1899); McDuff v.
McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 187 Pac. 37 (1919); Crater v. Crater,
118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290 (1888); Edmonds v. Edmonds,
139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924).
4. U.S,: Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Cal.: XWatson v. Watson,
39 Cal.2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219
(1909); Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App.2d 589, 235 P.2d 422 (1951); Cubbison v.
Cubbison, 73 Cal. App.2d 437, 166 P.2d 387 (1946); Del.: Ferguson vi. Davis, 48 Del.
299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954); Fla.: Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950);
Ga.: Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ca. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937); Ind.: Hunter v.
Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955); Iowa: In re Dolmage's Estate,
203 Iowa 231, 212 N.V. 553 (1927) (dictum); Kan.: Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan, 217,
239 P.2d 933 (1952); Me,: Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 Atl. 724 (1937)
(dictum); Md.: Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 Atl. 534 (1927);
Mass.: Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.Zd 637 (1948); Mich.: Kircher v.
Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Minn.: Karalis v. Karalis, 213 Minn.
31, 4 N.W.2d 632 (1942); Miss.: Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d
308 (1955); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Mo.: Willott v.
Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933); Mont.: Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont.
425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Neb.: Emerson v. Western Seed and Irrig. Co., 116 Neb. 180,
216 N.W. 297 (1927); N.J: Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N.J. Eq. 25, 133
At. 179 (1926); N.M.: Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748 (1954);
Pa.: Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 729 (1935) (dictum); R.I.: Oken v.
Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 Atl. 357 (1922); Tenn.: Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 113 Tenn. 57,
179 S.W. 628 (1915); Tex.: Worden v. Worden, 222 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949), rev'd on other grounds, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Vt.: Comstock
v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 AtI. 903 (1934); Va.: Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727,
71 S.E,2d 191 (1952); Wash.: Johnson v. Ottooieier, 45 Wash.2d 419, 275 P.2d
723 (1954); V. Va.: Polinz v. Polinz, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935);
Wyo.: McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
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married women's acts are ambiguous as to this point and do not expressly
confer upon the wife the right to bring a personal tort against her husband."
An exception to this general statutory ambiguity exists in three jurisdictions
which have, through statutory enactment, either specifically allowed 6 or
disallowed7 an action by one spouse against the other for a personal tort.
The reluctance of the majority to construe the emancipation acts as
completely abrogating the common law disabilities of married woman has
been further supported by several considerations. Thie following reasons have
been most commonly advanced to substantiate the general view maintaining
spousal disability as to personal torts: to promote domestic felicity and
conjugal harmony; to prevent fictitious, collusive, fraudulent and trivial
claims; to avoid a rise in liability insurance rates; adequate remedies exist
in divorce courts or through the institution of criminal proceedings.
All these arguments have been attacked by numerous writers' and it is
not the purpose of this comment to engage in any further critcism of the
various reasons advanced. It may be said in passing that all of these views.
have been advanced under the aegis of that all encompassing common
denominator - public policy.

In what may be termed a growing minority of jurisdictions, personal
tort actions between the spouses are now permitted." Interestingly enough
these jurisdictions have reached this result through an interpretation of
emancipation acts quite similar in content and language to those faced
5. Loranz v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 446, 209 P.2d 733, 737 (1949). "The
common law rule has generally been held not to have been changed by what is commonly
referred to as the Married Woman's Acts, and the question of whether or not such
action can be maintained is one of statutory construction, in which the courts of the
country are not in accord."
6. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 57.
7. Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953).

This statute was passed after

it had been held that an action for personal tort between spouses could be maintained;
Brandt v. Keller, 413 I11.
503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952). Louisiana: LA. CODE PRAC.
ANN. art. 105 (Dart. 1942).
8. N.Y. Ns. LAw § 167 (3) provides that no insurance policy should be
deemed to insure against any liability of an insured for injuries to his or her spouse,
unless the contrary is plainly expressed.
9. See Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955) (For an
excellent review of the various arguments, each of which the court found specious).

10. PRossER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1951); 1 IARPER AND JAMEs, LAW OF TORTS

§ 8.10 (1956); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations 43 HlAsv. L.
Rav. 1030 (1930).
11. Ala.: Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Harris v. Harris,
211 Ala. 222, 100 So. 333 (1924); Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335
(1917); Ark.: Katzenbcrg v. Katzenbcrg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931);
Colo.: Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Conn.: Ginsberg v. Ginsberg,
126 Conn. 146, 9 A.2d 812 (1939); Idaho: Loranz v. ttays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d
733 (19491; Ky.: Brown v. Cosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); N.H.: Gilman v.
Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915); N.D.: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D.
191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Ohio: Daum v. Elyra Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St.
107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952); Okla.: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d
660 (1938); S.C.: Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); S.D.:
Scolvold v. Scolvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 NV.W 266 (1941); Utah: Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954); Wis.: Forbes v. Forbes, 226 Wis. 477,
277 N.W. 112 (1938); Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 40 (1931).

COMMENTS
by the majority. Implicit in the result reached by the minority has been
12
a rejection of the so-called public policy argument.
In two jurisdictions a rather anomalous result has been reached,
whereby the wife is permitted to sue the husband for a tort to her person,
but such a right is not conferred upon the husband.'3 As in the other
minority jurisdictions the emancipation statutes were held to have taken
away the disability of the wife to sue the husband, but in the absence of
similar statutory authority the common law rule with respect to the husband
4
remained in force.'
INCONSISTENT MIDDLECROUND

Several jurisdictions, when confronted with certain factually unique
situations, have created exceptions to the common law rule of spousal
disability. It should be noted that the jurisdictions which have broken
with the majority, under these factual exceptions, still adhere to the general
rule of spousal disability. Discussion in this article is limited to those
jurisdictions which have modified the disability rule and those which follow
the rule en toto.
Pre-nuptial Torts
There is no conflict over the proposition that a party injured by a
future spouse has both a cause of action and a right of action against the
tort feasor at the time the tort occurs. However, when the injured party
and the tort feasor marry, the question. arises as to whether suit may be
brought or continued (if instituted prior to marriage) after this intermarriage.'5
In Koplick v. C. P. Trucking Co. the plaintiff, an autombile passenger,
was negligently injured by the defendant operator. After suit was brought
and while the action was pending, plaintiff and defendant were married.
The court, in allowing the action, squarely held that the public policy
argument of marital harmony was inapplicable.' 6 In an almost identical
factual situation the Missouri Supreme Court held the action maintainable.' 7 The court gave approval to a novel contention when it considered

12. See Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v.
General Ace. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
14. Ibid.
15. 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555 (1957).
16. "If the pendency of such an action was no obstacle to the deliberate entry
13. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C.

of the parties into the marital relationship itself in the first instance, we see no rational

basis for the entertainment of a presumption that the continued prosecution of the
action, patently contemplated when the parties married, will be substantially deleterious
to that relationship . . . . Where the underlying policy of 'domestic peace and
felicity' is not factually implicated, the rule of immunity will not be mechanically
applied by the courts." Id. at 201, 135 A.2d at 558.
17. Hamiton v. Fulkerson, 285 SW.2d 642 (Mo. 1955).
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a cause of action owned by a woman prior to marriage as being part of
her separate property which was not extinquished by marriage.' 8
Despite the compelling language supporting complete abrogation of
the disability rule,' the decisions in both Koplick and Hamilton were
careful to limit their holdings to the factual situations at hand; a prime
example of an adherence to stare decisis in the face of an admitted modern
social trend.
It must be observed that most courts still apply the spousal disability
even when an antenuptial tort is involved.20 The position of these courts
was well stated in Carmichael v. Carmichael:21 "Under the common law
all rights of action by a wife for antenuptial wrongs committed by her
husband are extinguished by their subsequent marriage.
Divorce and Annulment
Where the marital status has been terminated by legal decree, some
jurisdictions have permitted a spouse to maintain an action in tort which
accrued before, during or after coverture.22
In Steele v. Steele2 3 the wife's action against her former husband for
an assault committed after she received a final divorce decree, but before
the decree became cffective, 24 was held maintainable. Commenting upon
the domestic felicity argument the court stated: "This argument savors
more of a rationalization of a preconceived notion than of bona fide
25
reasoning leading to a logical conclusion."
18. Id. at 644. The same property analysis was adopted in Carver v. Ferguson,
254 P.2d 44 (Cal. App. 1953). However, that decision is only of academic value
since the Supreme Court of California granted a hearing. A personal tort action between
spouses, based on a premarital tort, was permitted in Shirley v, Ayers, 201 N.C. 51,
158 S.E. 840 (1931) ("semble").
19. "it is not apparent to us that the maintenance of an action by one spouse
against the other for an antenuptial personal tort would disrupt domestic tranquility
any more than do permitted actions between spouses based on wrongful acts affecting
their separate property." Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955).
20. Where the action was brought before marriage: Spetor v. Weisman, 59 App.
D.C. 280, 40 F.2d 792 (1930); Lubowitz v. Tarries, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320
(1936); Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946); Raines v. Mercer,
165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932); Staats v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125
W.Va. 473, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943). Where the action was brought after marriage:
Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ca. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Patenaude v.
Patenande, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439,
151 So. 551 (1934); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
21. Supra note 20, at 116.
22. Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946) (after marriage); Lorang
v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) (during marriage); Henneger v.Lomas,
145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896) (before marriage); Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So.2d
670 (La. App. 1954) (during marriage); see also cases collected in 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 644.
23. 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946).
24. Id. at 332. "In the District of Columbia a decree of absolute divorce does
not take effect until the expiration of six months after its entry (D.C. Code, tit. 16,
§ 421)." The fact that the tort occurred after the decree of absolute divorce was
entered permitted the court to distinguish Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611
(1910) which adherred to the common law after strictly interpreting the Married
Women's Act. (D.C. Code
30-208, 1940).
25. Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.D.C. 1946). The court further
recognized that since "a wife is at liberty to apply to the police and prosecuting
authorities as well as to the criminal courts for redmess, surely, this recourse is as apt
to be disturbing to family tranquility as a resort to civil actions for damages."
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The same result obtained in a recent Louisiana case 26 for a tort
committed during coverture, action being brought after a divorce. The
court construed the wife's disability as a relative incapacity to prosecute
27
her cause of action which is removed by an absolute divorce.
In denying the wife's action against her husband for a tort committed
during the marriage, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 28 considered
9
=
a voidable marriage as being valid until annulled,
The theory that no cause of action arises for a personal tort committed
by one spouse upon the other would no longer seem valid with the
demise of fictional unity. Furthermore the termination of the marriage
by divorce or annulment would appear to make the public policy argument
of marital harmony inapplicable. Most jurisdictions now recognize that
there has been a wrong, but that the injured spouse is under a personal
disability to sue.30 Therefore when the marital status has been legally
concluded, reason would seem to dictate that since there are no longer
any reasons remaining to support a disability, the right of action should
be permitted.
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
Where the tort feasor spouse, the wronged spouse or both, are
deceased and an action has been brought under a wrongful death or
survival statute, the general rule of spousal disability has met with
declining applicability.3 ' The usual wrongful death statute contains the
expressed or implied condition that there can only be recovery if the
injured party could have maintained an action if death had not ensued. "
The condition, literally taken, makes the action a derivative one.
Using this argument, some courts have reasoned that since the wronged
spouse would not be permitted to sue if he or she had lived, any person
suing for the wrongful death of the spouse should similarly be barred.3 3
One court buttressed its literal interpretation of the statute by revitalizing
26. Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1954).
27. Id. at 674. "Article 159, LSA-C.C., provides: 'Effects of a divorce. - The
effects of a divorce shall . . . dissolve, forever the bonds of matrimony between the
parties, and place them in the same situation with respect to each other as if no
marriage had ever been contracted between them ." (Emphasis added.)

28. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).

29. Id. at 640. The court followed the reasoning of one English cask-, Dodworth v.
Dale, 2 K.B. 503, 519 (1936) holding "that which has been done during the
continuance of the de facto marriage cannot be undone - cannot be overturned by the
operation of law."
30. "[TIhe

disability of the wife to sue is one personal to her, and does not

inhere in the tort itself. The assault upon her is wrongful even though she is under

a personal disability to sue." Deposit Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. v, Nelson, 212 Miss.
33, 54 So,2d 476 (1951).
31. See cases cited in notes 35 and 42 infra.
32. For a typical wrongful death statute see FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01, 768,02 (1957).
33. Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Vilson v. Brown,
154 S.W, 322 (Tex. App. 1912); Wright v. Davis, 132 W.Va. 722, 53 S.E,2d
335 (1949).

104
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the unity ghost and used language to the effect that a spouse was not merely
34
disabled to sue the other for tort but that there simply was no tort!
The hurdle of a more liberal construction of the wrongful death statute
is minimized when the factual circumstances under which the action is
brought are viewed in a more realistic light. Several courts have held that
with the termination of the marital relationship by the death of one or
both spouses reasons no longer exist for the application of the general
disability rule.33 In Rodney v. Stamon,36 the court said: "The public
policy which prevents a wife from suing her husband in tort has no
relevancy to facts such as are here present. The oneness of spouses has
been abolished and with the death intervening, there is no longer family
harmony to be conserved."
The argument that no action could be brought under the wrongful
death statute, because of its derivative nature, was adequately dispensed
with in a well reasoned Pennsylvania case.37 Recognizing that the action
was derivative, the court nevertheless observed: "Its derivation is from
the tortious act, and not from the person of the deceased, so that it
comes to the parties named in the statute free from personal disabilities
arising from the relationship of the injured party and tort feasor ... ,,31
Under the survival statutes, enacted in all jurisdictions, 9 an action
for personal injuries survives the death of the injured party or the tort
feasor and can be maintaincd by or against the respective personal representative.10 Where the persons involved were husband and wife at the
time of the tort, the question arises as to whether there is a cause of action
to survive. 4' The underlying problem is not a great deal different from
that involved in actions under the wrongful death statute. That is, will
the disability continue to ensue even after the death of one or both spouse?
Two recent cases with identical factual situations held that a personal
injury action by the wife against her deceased husband's estate could be
maintained.4 2 Answering the question of whether there was a cause of
action which survived, the Missouri court stated: "In one sense, of course,
34. Apitz v. Dames, supra note 33.
35. Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Welch v. Davis, 410 111.130,
101 N.E.2d 547 (1951); Deposit Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. v. Nelson, 212 Miss.
33, 54 So.2d 476 (1951); Rodney v. Starnan, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A2d 313 (1952) (applying
Ohio law); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 32 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936); Johnson v.
Ottomcier, 45 Wash.2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954).
36. Rodney v. Starnan, sutpra note 35, at 5, 89 A.2d at 315.
37. Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 32 Pa. at 440, 184 Atl. at 664.
38. This reasoning was accepted in Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547
(1951); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952); Johnson v. Ottoneier,
45 Wash.2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954).
39. See PROSSER, TORTS 708 (2d ed. 1955).
40. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1957).
41. See Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 110,
114, 145 A.2d 716, 718 (1958).
42. Ennis v. Trulutte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957); Johnson v. Peoples First
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 110, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).

COMMENTS

if one spouse may not sue the other there is no enforceable cause of
action, but it belies reality and fact to say that there is no tort when the
husband either intentionally or negligently injures his wife," 43 In commenting
upon the absence of any public policy in such a situation, the Pennsylvania
court observed: "Death having terminated the marriage, domestic harmony
and felicity suffer no damage from the allowance of the enforcement of
44
the cause of action."
The courts that continue to apply the disability rule where death of
a spouse has intervened are blihdly following a proposition in situations
where it has no reasonable basis. They certainly have failed to take cognizance
of the age old maxim: "When the policy behind a rule no longer exists,
45
the rule should disappear."
Intentional torts
Since the public policy argument most often applied by the courts
in maintaining spousal disability is the preservation of marital harmony,
it might logically be assumed that a distinction would often be made
between willful or intentional torts and those torts classified as unintentional.
There would not seem to be very much marital harmony to preserve when
one spouse commits a battery upon the other.
However, there appears to be only one decision in which a clear cut
46
distinction between intentional and unintentional torts has been made.
In this case the Oregon Supreme Court had before it a wrongful death
action brought by the wife's executor against the administrator of the
husband's estate. The husband had murdered his wife and committed
suicide. Initially, the court failed to follow the lead of several decisions
which interpreted the wrongful death statute as giving rise to a new and
independent action when. it held that "the Oregon Death Statute means
exactly what it says."

47

This interpretation required the court to answer

the basic question: Could the wife have maintained the action if she
were alive? The affirmative answer given to this question is somewhat
startling in view of the position taken in the first part of the opinion. The

court observed that where a husband inflicts intentional harm upon his
wife, "the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged that
there is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintenance
of an action for damages and she may therefore maintain an action."48
The significance of this holding becomes clear when one considers
the total effect of the in-road upon the general rule of spousal disability
in tort actions. The court has, taking the decision out of its wrongful
43.
44.
A.2d at
45.
46.
47.
48.

Ennis v. Trulutte, supra note 42, at 551.
Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank and 'rust Co., 394 Pa. at 116, 145
719.
Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 32 Pa. at 444, 184 At]. at 665.
Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955).
Id. at 252, 287 P.2d at 590.
Id. at 271, 287 P.2d at 598.
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death context, apparently established a new exception by permitting an
action for intentional tort even though both spouses are still alive and
married to each other.
Vicarious liability

Following the rule, as set forth by Justice Cardozo in Schubert v. August
Schubert Wagon Co.,49 most subsequent cases have held that spousal
disability did not operate to prevent one spouse from suing the master

of the other for a tort committed by the'servant spouse." The fact, that
to allow the action is to permit the wife or husband to do indirectly
what she or he may not do directly, has not disturbed the courts.
It is recognized, in this situation, that the rule forbidding personal tort
actions between spouses is now based only on a personal immunity of the
spouse not to be sued and is inapplicable where the action is brought against
a stranger to the marriage:
A trespass, negligent or willful, upon the person of a wife, does
not cease to be an unlawful act, though the law exempts the
husband from liability for the damage. Others may not hide behind
the skirts of his innunity."' (Emphasis added.)
FLORIDA TRENDS
Florida follows the majority of jurisdictions in denying a right of action
against one's spouse for a personal tort.5 2 The leading case on this issue,
Corren v. Corren,I held that a wife could not maintain an action against
her husband for personal injuries resulting from the negligent operation
of an automobile by their daughter, to whom the husband had entrusted
the car. The court, in its reluctance to modify or abrogate the common
law, took refuge in the fictional unity of husband and wife.' In finding
49. 249 NY. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
50. Broaddus v. Kilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940); Pittsley v.
David, 298 Mass. 510, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937); Mullally v. Latngcnberg Bros. Grain Co.,
339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936); Hudson v. Gas Consumer's Ass'n., 123 N.J.L. 252,
8 A.2d 337 (1939); Kooutz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935); LaSage v.
LaSage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
51. Shubert v. August Shubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 256, 164 N.E. 42,
43 (1928).
52. Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d
706 (Fla. 1955); COrren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
53. Corren v. Corren, supra note 52.
54. Id. at 775. Authority which strongly tended to deny the validity

of the

unity theory was distinguished on rather weak grounds. The affect of FLA. STAT.
§§ 708.08, 708.09 (1957), were restricted to actions involving the wife's "separate
property and dealings with persons other than her husband." Similarly State v. Ilendron,

158 Fla. 115, 27 So.2d 833 (1946)

(husband

chargeable with larceny of wife's

separate property) was held to have no modifying affect, since "after all that was a

controversy between the state and the husband to punish him for the theft of property
belonging to the wife." Conversely the dictum in Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131,
138 So. 755 (1932) was elevated to the status of holding to permit the conclusion
that the FLA. CONST. art. I1, § I and FLA. STAT. ch. 708 (1941) had not altered
the common law. A final criticism is the court's failure to comment upon 'fresher v.
McElroy, 90 Fla. 372, 106 So. 79 (1925) which held that the common law rule of
unity of husband and wife was no bar to an action of replevin by the wife against

her husband's vendee to recover her automobile.
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that "this unity or more accurately merger, has been called the foundation
for the rights, duties, and disabilities of marriage,"5' the court also expressed
a concern for marital harmony and similar considerations of public policy.
THie unity argument of the Corren case5 s was quietly disposed of by
the Florida Supreme Court in Shiver v. Sessions.5" As a result of this shift,
"public policy" has acquired the dubious distinction of being the only
rationale now used by Florida to support the common law disability."
"Thus, it is settled law in this jurisdiction that the wife's disability to
sue her husband for his tort is personal to her, and does not inhere in the
tort itself."59 1
In Shiver v. Sessions ° a husband killed his wife and then committed
suicide. The court held that the spousal disability rule did not bar an
action by the minor children as beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death
Act. " ' In the companion case of Sullivan v. Sessions62 spousal disability
was held to bar an action against the husband's estate brought under the
Survival Statute 3 by the wife's personal representative. The personal representative under the Survival
Statute was considered as one who simply
'
"stands in her shoes"65
and can have no greater right than the wife
would have had during her lifetime.
The administrator, in the absence of other entitled persons, would
have been able to successfully bring suit under the 'Wrongful Death Act. ""
It would therefore appear that the defense of spousal disability is only
valid when the action is brought in the name of "survival." The anamoly
55. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d at 775, quoting with approval Taylor v. Dorsey,
155 Fla. 305, 312, 19 So.2d 876, 880 (1944).
56. Corren v. Corren, supra note 55.
57. 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
58. Id. at 906. "lilt is generally held that the rule should still be adhered to,
either on the ground that the Emancipation Act in question did not completely
destroy the common law fiction of the unity of husband and wife, or on the ground that
domestic tranquility is fostered by the prohibition of actions by a wife against her
husband for his torts against her. It was apparently the latter ground which was the
basis for our decision in the Corren case. ...
59. Id. at 907. This statement sounded the death knell for the "unity" of husband
and wife in Florida. Under a strict interpretation of the unity theory the husband
and wife arc fictionally merged into one, the husband being that one. It therefore
follows that aside from there being no right of action, the merged identity of the
husband more significantly precludes the existence of a cause of action, since in effect
he would be suing himself.
60. 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
61. FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1957); see also Florida East Coast Ry. v. McRoberts,
Ill Fla. 278, 149 So. 631, 633 (1933). The "[c]onclusion is irrefutable, that the
statutes grant a new right of action for death by wrongful act, and not merely a
continuation of the old one by way of a substituted form of action in favor of the
deceased's representatives .... " (Emphasis added.)
62. 80 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955).
63. FLA. STAT. § 45.01 (1957).
64. Ibid.
65. Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d at 707.
66. FLA. STAT. 768.02 (1957). Love v. Hannah, 72 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1954)
held that the administrator of decedent's estate may not maintain a suit for wrongful
death in the absence of an affirmative showing of the nonexistence of any other person
having a precedent right of action under FIA. STAT. § 768.02.
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created by the two Sessions cases is not too unusual when one considers
the statutes involved and the similar anamolies created by the types of
67
recoveries permitted thereunder.
May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co.,68 held that a wife's disability to
sue her husband for personal injuries did not relieve the owner of the
automobile from liability for injuries sustained as a result of her husband's
gross negligence. 9 A forerunner of this case, Webster v. Snyder," held
that plaintiff's marriage to defendant's servant did not abate the plaintiff's
right of action against the master for the negligence of the servant. Dicta
in the opinion did indicate that plantiff's marriage to defendant did
abate any right of action she might have against him.7 ' Restricting the
above two decisions to their affect on spousal disability,72 it must be
concluded that the disability is at its weakest where third party liability
is involved.
The most recent decision to concern itself with the Florida disability
rule was rendered by a federal district court sitting in South Carolina. 7"
The wife brought art action against her husband based on a tort committed
in Florida. In holding the action maintainable the court's purported
application of Florida law was clearly erroneous. In reaching this result
the court observed: "that the common law of Florida has been abrogated
by the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the
State of Florida, and that one spouse can now sue another in the State
of Florida for tortious acts committed by one spouse upon the other
spouse. . ,

4

The weak reasoning of the Correns case,7 5 the inroads by the May76
and Webster 7 decisions and the limited applicability of the disability
where the injured spouse is deceased78 have cracked the foundation of the
67. See English v. United States, 204 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1953).
68. 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
69. Florida has reached a result, through judicial decision, whereby the owner of
an automobile is vicariously liable for the negligence of anyone driving the vehicle
with his consent. Fleming v. Alter. 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953); Lynch v. Walker,
159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947). The basis for this result is well expressed in
May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., supra note 68, at 472. "A study of the origin and
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability on the part of an automobile owner
shows clearly that whatever may be the limitations of its scope of application,
liability is bottomed squarely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior arising from
a principal and agent relationship implied in law."
70. Webster v. Snyder. 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
71. Id. See comment on case, note 54 supra.
72. 'The issue of agency indicated in note 69 supra has been omitted from this
discussion.
73. Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. S.C. 1956).
74. Id. at 929.

75. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).

76. May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
77. Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
78. Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (lia. 1955) permitting action under FLA.
STAT. § 768.02 (1957). It is interesting to note that since a spouse precedes all other
named beneficiaries, a double death situation would have to result before a suit could
successfully be maintained.

COMMENTS

continued adherence to the majority view by Florida. The switch in emphasis
from unity to the more tenable approach of public policy has laid the
groundwork for further modifications and possibly complete abrogation
of the common law rule. Shiver v. Sessions70 brought public policy to the
forefront, but the court did little to fortify it there or in the Sullivan case 0
where factual circumstances presented an excellent opportunity for further
elucidation. "It is commendable in either spouse to reconcile differences
in order to harmonize the marital status, but neither is required to live in
a buzzards nest to do so."'s

Recent decisions indicate that the Supreme Court of Florida is
dissatisfied with an unrestricted application of spousal disability. Because
of this dissatisfaction, it is believed that the court may now be ready to
3
construe more liberally the Florida Constitution S2 and Emancipation Act.
Sufficient pronouncements of judicial sentiment exists to permit the court
to re-evaluate its position, so as to extend "emancipation" to include a
wife's person as well as her property. Obviously the effect of this statutory
extension would be to abrogate completely the common law spousal
disability. "We think it has not only been abrogated by law, it has been
abrogated by custom, the very thing out of which the common law was
derived." 4
CONCLUSION

The disability applied to personal tort actions by the majority is not
the same disability that existed at comifion law. By denying validity to
legalistic unity concept of husband and wife, the courts have destroyed
the foundation for the rule. Left without any legal basis and with a desire to

continue the disability rule there has been developed, as an afterthought,
a public policy argument which can be characterized as both unrealistic
and questionable.
As a result of a reshaping of the rule upon the framework of public
policy, the courts no longer need concern themselves with the specter of
abrogating the common law in any subsequent alteration of the disability. All
that they would be doing is rejecting the concept of public policy, which
they themselves have created and are gradually finding outdated. With
these thoughts in mind it is not difficult to predict the eventual disappearance
of the marital disability concept in personal tort actions.
DONALD J. POST AND MARK

W.
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79. 80 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1955).
80, Sullivan v.Sessions, 80 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955).
81. Klimis v. Klimis, 158 Fla. 159, 162, 28 So.2d 112, 114 (1946).
82. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. 11, §§ 1, 2.
83. FLA. STAT. ch. 708 (1957).

84. State v.Hendron, 158 Fla. 115, 118, 27 So.2d 833, 835 (1946). The words
of Justice Terrell concerning a married woman's separate property are just as applicable
today to the spousal disability to sue for personal tort.

